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| Where's the counter-terror strategy? |
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Tuesday, November 24, 2009
Mushahid Hussain
The writer is a senator and senior political analyst.
An interesting dynamic seems to be developing in today's Pakistan. There is an inverse relationship between the success of Pakistan's counter-insurgency and the failure of the country's counter-terrorism. Clearly, since the beginning of the military offensive in April, the militants are on the run but, concurrently, they have run amok by striking Pakistan's urban population at a time and target of their own choosing.
The government is reduced to expressing impotent rage, with the usual condemnation, compensation and commissioning an inquiry whose findings have never seen the light of day. There is now little doubt that Pakistan has no effective or workable counter-terror strategy. If we had one, it probably lies buried, tucked away in the locked files of officialdom.
Pakistan today is witnessing the worst type of terrorism in its history. Never before have people borne the brunt of such a vicious cycle of violence directed at innocent civilians. Terrorism needs to be treated as the county's foremost national security problem, not just as a local police issue of law and order. It is the single biggest source of destabilisation of the state.
Three kinds of failures are evident. First, barring a couple of instances, there is a marked inability of Intelligence to anticipate possible acts of terrorism. Second, investigation of terror acts is generally carried out in a haphazard, non-professional and casual manner. Third, there is a visible absence of coordination within the government.
Take the case of two of the biggest terror strikes in 2009, both of which were predicted in advance and the predictions published in the print media. The attack on the Sri Lankan cricketers and the attempted storming of the GHQ had the hallmarks of the audacious Mumbai attacks. The Punjab CID had forewarned about these two attacks with considerable precision.
What is worse is that, instead of accepting an obvious failure, the government has resorted to an ostrich-like approach, taking refuge in ridiculous bureaucratic arguments. For instance, whenever Peshawar or Lahore is attacked, the federal government says "that's a provincial issue since it pertains to law and order." Not to be left behind, the provincial governments explain their helplessness by saying since "this is an international conspiracy; hence, it is a foreign policy issue." Then there is the favourite form of denial: refusal to accept that the killing of innocent children, women and men can be the work of any Muslim or Pakistani!
That's not surprising, as there has been a national state of denial on this issue for the past couple of decades. Terrorism and extremism in Pakistan predate 9/11, fallouts from regional conflicts, combined with a growing homespun problem of terrorism and extremism. But the political will to take tough decisions or seek out-of-the box solutions, requiring reinventing the bureaucracy, were lacking.
A recent illustration of this absence of political will aptly reflect official priorities. In October 2008, when the president went to China, a decision was taken to buy Chinese security scanners (able to scan trucks and other big vehicles), with the Chinese offering an immediate soft loan. A year later, no implementation of that decision is in sight, although such sophisticated security technology is imperative in the light of the clear and present danger faced by Pakistanis. What good has the 17th Amendment done to a "powerful" president who can't even implement his own decision regarding the life and property of the people? There may be a state of emergency regarding terrorism, but there is certainly no sense of urgency amongst officialdom.
Counter-terrorism is no rocket science that a country like Pakistan, with a modern state apparatus, cannot cope or contain. Since the government still seems to be at a loss on countering terrorism, a few suggestions are in order on what can be done to face Pakistan's number one challenge.
On the intelligence front, there is need for clarity and coordination. There is just no substitute for an efficient local police effort in garnering information, pursuing investigative leads and tracking the sources of terror. This has been the missing link in Pakistan's failure to fashion an effective approach–the police and its provincial intelligence wings, the Special Branch and CID, need to be modernised and beefed up.
While the battle for the soul of Pakistan is being fought, with the nation solidly behind the country's defenders, the most important ingredient in any such campaign is still missing, namely, the people. The campaign against terrorism remains confined to the VIP sector only – government leaders, the international community, the military brass – with no popular involvement. The kind of mobilisation that can be done through the media is just not there, and the government is dithering, acting like a "fire brigade," dousing flames and doing damage control.
A media-awareness campaign needs to be launched to provide safety guidelines to the public and a hotline made operational where people can give tips, information or even suggestions that are then translated into policy. Those who have helped the government or the security forces invariably end up being victims, especially in FATA, where many have been killed along with their families as a form of "retaliation" for support to the government effort. A Pakistani version of the Witness Protection Programme also needs to be in place, to prevent such recurring tragedies.
We see a number of religious scholars and clerics speaking up in television programmes, but there has been no concerted effort to collectively mobilise such experts. They should be brought together on one platform so that they can present a united front for a fatwa rejecting killing of the innocent and suicide bombings. This would immensely help in swaying public opinion to oppose such un-Islamic acts.
An abiding failure has been the inability to prosecute those responsible for such crimes. This is largely on account of poor police investigation, the absence of modern forensic and DNA laboratories, as well as a justice system where judges fear for their lives and those of their families should they go through the gamut of trial and conviction. Italy found an innovative way to ensure the security of judges trying mafia dons – their identity was hidden and when they appeared in courtrooms, established within maximum-security prisons, they masked their faces.
There is a need for a maximum-security prison where only terrorists are kept in isolation – a place, for instance, like the Attock Fort, and that could also be used as a courtroom to try them. Definitely, a more productive utilisation of that dreaded fortress than incarcerating political prisoners.
The popular support on this issue has more to do with the inhuman actions of the terrorists, especially the killing spree of the past few months. It is high time the government realised that this battle is too big to be fought and won by an individual, a party, a government or the army alone. It has to be an organised, well-thought-out national effort requiring sustenance from the people. Let it not be said that the sacrifices of Pakistan's soldiers and civilians were in vain simply because the ruling elite was too busy pursuing their petty personal interests.
The people of Pakistan deserve better; at the minimum, an expectation that the government perform its core duty of protecting their lives and property, an area where the government performance has been one vast failure.
There is still time for the government to wake up from its slumber and get cracking on forging a doable counter-terror strategy, which would be a force multiplier for the ongoing counter-insurgency campaign.
Email: mushahid.hussain@gmail.com
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ISSN 1563-9479 
