Rule without taking over

A foreigner visiting our land these days would be forgiven for mistaking, even if for a while, Pakistan for Thailand or Egypt – where muscular militaries have politicians by the scruff of the necks, making most to vainly flail and wail. Such is the imbalance in the importance of the two in the national discourse that the army looks like a 20-feet tall lord of the realm while public representatives seem to be mere minions and Lilliputians.
There is a touch of dark irony in the fact that most of the political parties that have dwarfed in comparison to the military’s perceived centrality to the country’s future wanted, in different forms and shapes, a modern Turkey-like Pakistan with powerful generals firmly in check and their ability to call the shots in strict compliance with the decisions of those voted to power.
What has made Pakistan’s democrats gravitate towards accepting a soft coup?
There are several reasons for this strange state of affairs, and none have anything to do with what the generals may or may not have done to push their power above that of the politicians.
The first reason relates to self-defeating politics. Since the 2013 elections the rules of the game that all sane voices have been propounding for streamlining national politics have been repeatedly flouted. The PTI’s single-minded focus on delegitimising the present political system on the assumption that the entire electoral exercise has been fraudulent has unhinged the whole edifice. The ruthlessness of the attack on elected and administrative institutions, carried out in the name of creating a new Pakistan, has delivered gaping wounds on the entire governance apparatus.
The PTI leadership is hopeful that these temporary jolts are eventually going to be the tools shaping a shining model of genuine democracy. Maybe they will be but that ideal seems to be still far on the horizon. In the meanwhile the damage done on the public perception index about what this system stands for – sleaze, fraud, incompetence, manipulation etc – has been fairly widespread. The general take on Pakistan’s present political order is that it gives the country nothing but toil, sweat and blood. While the PTI has tried its best to present Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as a remarkable exception to this diseased system, recent local bodies elections and other observable failings of the system have rendered such claims fairly ordinary and even valueless. Everybody now looks the same.
When politicians don’t own up to the political order they represent and instead dismiss it disdainfully, the resultant vacuum is filled by traditional forces with old claims. In Pakistan the army has been such a force with strong claims to being the guardian of state interests, and of late, a true reflector of people’s aspirations. Its influence is bound to grow.
The second reason relates to political priorities that the PML-N has set for itself after spending two shaky years in power. The crux of these priorities – decided and determined, in large measure, in the wake of Imran Khan’s siege of Islamabad – is that they must keep the army happy and satisfied. This has meant not just gushing praise for every step the army takes but a total concession to chose and decide how they want to fix Pakistan’s trouble-spots: Fata, Balochistan, Karachi. While this looks like a straightforward agreement to play the second fiddle, in reality, this is a typical tactic unsure governments adopt for not confronting tough issues themselves and leaving the cleansing to be done by ‘others’.
There is another self-serving method to the madness of conceding critical decision-making powers to the army over Pakistan’s grim challenges, and this is to avoid being blamed for failure. The Nawaz Sharif government has been exceedingly careful in not being seen to be the architect of the solutions being applied to internal insurgencies, law and order problems and organised crime. It has given its blessings to all that the army has done in response to these challenges but it has not taken practical ownership of the applied solutions.
Some PML-N leaders admit that this is because in some cases (like the MQM) they believe that the country’s establishment is only reaping what it had sowed, while in other cases (such as operations in Fata) the challenges are too complex and the cost of even partial failure too large for the government to bear. So they let them do what they want.
Whatever the reason, the Nawaz Sharif government has allowed the generals’ influence to deepen to please them and, more crucially, to avoid the test of playing a lead role on tough matters. This policy will continue. Already there are rumours that in recognition of his glorious services Gen Raheel Sharif would be asked to continue as army chief for another two years. Such propositions are power ploys, deliberate charms extended to keep the brass glowing.
The third factor explaining the unfolding of a slow, soft and (still) benign coup is the political leadership’s incompetence and pure neglect of the heavy responsibility that comes with elected power. While hardly any part of Pakistan shows brilliant governance on display, in certain corners of the country the score-sheet is not just disastrous, it is an index of crime.
Sindh’s mafias that concentrate on the gravy train that Karachi has become for their loot and plunder explain this sad fact more effectively than anything else. You don’t have to be the director general of the Rangers or the head of the ISI or the corps commander of Karachi to know and hear things that are said about how political forces patronise crime and urban terrorism. These are Sindh’s worst kept secrets.
You don’t have to be a political scientist or an investigative journalist to know how deeply compromised and dysfunctional Sindh government is whose head cannot even transfer a peon without first seeking a nod from Bilawal House. These are well-known facts. A government that spouts lofty political philosophy and never tires of speaking about people’s rights but cannot provide water to citizens two kilometres from its backyard is not exactly positioned to command respect, much less authority – especially now that much of this authority has been conceded in the shape of the 21st Amendment and the apex committees. On top of it, if its leaders have their hands in the till and kill without fear, whatever moral standing it could possess is easily lost.
Together these factors have created a situation where Pakistan’s struggling democracy is losing both form and substance. When misgovernance becomes the norm, when empty rhetoric is used to fill policy gaps and when the political elite bleed each other with a thousand cuts instead of reforming and performing, other strong institutions expand their influence.
Pakistan’s generals do not seem to have an agenda (yet). They don’t seem to have the itch for more power (yet). They are still quite far from falling to the temptation of taking over (yet). Democracy is still in place.
But then they don’t have to do any of the above. Politicians are doing a fine job of giving them so much power, a wide agenda and centrality to decision-making that they don’t have to take over to rule. Why shake the constitution to get your way when shaking the finger is enough to get the job done.
The writer is former executive editor of The News and a senior journalist with Geo TV.
Email: syedtalathussain@gmail.com
Twitter: @TalatHussain12