China has made its move. Typically, it is mega, long-term, and splendid. The large-scale investment in Pakistan through over four-dozen agreements is not notional. Nor is it just a continuation of the old strategic ties that Beijing and Islamabad have spent decades in developing. Through this move China is looking
BySyed Talat Hussain
April 27, 2015
China has made its move. Typically, it is mega, long-term, and splendid. The large-scale investment in Pakistan through over four-dozen agreements is not notional. Nor is it just a continuation of the old strategic ties that Beijing and Islamabad have spent decades in developing. Through this move China is looking to open (to borrow a phrase from Riaz Khokar, Pakistan’s former foreign secretary) a big back-door through Pakistan onto seas, oceans and continents for energy, for business and for asserting itself as a superpower in the making. The move is also part of China’s counter to US-pampered Indian power projection, and Washington’s crass attempts at creating a ring of pivots and engagement spots that could dissipate Beijing’s prowess by embroiling it in its near-abroad. This plan had been a long time coming. While it culminated in the recent visit, the effort to take this partnership to the next level had been in the works for years. Clearly Pakistan, its army and the present government, have been, at different levels, at it consistently and quietly. I can recall many meetings with senior military officials and diplomats last year in which different elements of this partnership were mentioned in much detail. Clearly, therefore, Pakistan too has made a strategic calculation to go the whole hog with China on this path. It is an alliance for the coming decades. It is a handshake that can potentially shake regional politics and reshape global affairs. However, the operative part of the sentence is ‘potentially’. For this potential to be realised in actuality, several things need to happen. Most of these things happen to fall on our side of the bargain. Foremost is stability. China’s engagement with Pakistan hinges on the assumption that our domestic scenario would remain calm and not suffer the kind of trauma that has defined most part of our history. Political protests boiling over into the streets, agitational politics that destroys economic growth, absence of consensus on governance that stymies reform, and poverty that translates into discontentment and disorder are items that have to be off the list of Pakistan’s internal matters. Not that the Chinese would pull out if these things were to happen in Pakistan – the Chinese never pull out – but these distractions (as they call them) would slow down their march forward. It would create exactly the kind of a situation that they are investing in here to avoid elsewhere. They don’t want a swamp. They want a fast track. They want smooth sailing through this route. Plus they want profit on their money as well as its safe return. They will help like they always do in enabling the state of Pakistan to do some of this work but the burden of maintaining long-term order clearly lies with us. Pakistan will also have to create a political buy-in for this partnership. This is the second requirement. The partnership cannot be the ‘achievement of one party’ of the sort that does not get the same priority by another party in case of change in government. In other words, the Chinese expect to see the same kind of model in business and investment transactions that they have developed in the field of defence. Projects that start now are going to roll on for decades. The government that is starting them today may not be in power when these finish – and that should not matter at all. That is how the Chinese have planned their move. This is how they want Pakistan to embrace and execute the planned move – a business deal of strategic proportions that is beyond and above politics and, all else failing, guaranteed to bear fruit by the Pakistan Army, the permanent government. We are also expected to raise our game as far as project completion capability is concerned. Whether it is infrastructure or trained manpower to manage the arteries on the map of the idea, whether it is dispute resolution mechanisms, and creating an enabling environment to speedily turn investment into productivity our system has to step up and deliver at the same pace as that of the Chinese. Now this is asking for something: we have a history of brilliance in executing projects, but it is patchy and inconsistent. Generally, we don’t fare well on most indices that clock different countries’ ability to optimise business opportunities by meeting deadlines. This time around we will have to improve our track record for some of the dreams that official hawkers are selling to us after the Chinese president’s visit to come true. Seen collectively, what Pakistan needs to do to make use of the promised $45 billion worth of investment plus soft loans appears to be a tall order. A political system that cannot agree on how to hold elections and whose leaders dissipate more energies on belittling each other than on joining hands to craft a national vision might not look to be geared towards being speedy and productive. Or be in a situation to stay in step with the Chinese roller-coaster. But then since everyone realises that China is serious business and it cannot be messed with, there is realistic hope that on this count everyone will sing in unison and put the best foot forward. Already, the hue and cry that the PTI raised last year during the dharna days over the nature of these agreements and MoUs with China is conspicuous by its absence. Everyone seems to be on one page. But this does not mean that the system will also begin to perform so well that we would meet all the requirements for realising the full potential of this new phase in cooperation without delay or disasters. Slogans can motivate people. Systems need reform to click. In the coming months the federal and provincial governments will be truly tested on the quality of effort they put in to change bureaucratic laziness and inveterate systemic corruption that defeats joint ventures. The private sector – a significant component of this cooperation – too would be required to keep the larger context in which Pakistan-China ties are entering: it is not (just) about profit-maximisation; it is about maximisation of mutual national interests. This list of challenges before us would remain incomplete without mentioning two core problems that would come up as surely as night follows day. One is sabotage. Aligning and integrating with China at this level means carrying the burden of the backlash as well. The US and India combine will leave no stone unturned to make sure that this plank of Chinese strategy slips and falls. This is a global game of high stakes. We should not expect less from those playing this game. Therefore, government and state both should brace for internal upheavals, border tensions and terrorism of a much higher grade than what this country has witnessed so far. The other problem relates to something entirely different: how much space is available to have candid debate on those issues that pertain to internal security and impinge on the core of our cooperation with China. Pakistan’s state institutions have a history of keeping information locked into opaque meeting rooms and brutally discouraging ideas that run counter to what they believe is the final wisdom. They did the same when they hitched their stars with the US. They would do the same now that they are shifting to China town. The temptation to kill information, demolish alternative debate and destroy debaters should be resisted. Cooperation with China is tremendously important. We all know this. But it cannot be pushed down throats that want to speak up on its different dimensions, some of which will never be part of the official versions and rosy pictures being painted all around us but are critical in remaining realistic about the costs of such a deep cooperation entails. Ideas that endorse curtailing civil liberties and truncating freedom to ask questions on matters of ‘core national interest’ are dangerous propositions. They backfire. They create bad blood between state and society and almost always never achieve their intended aim of silencing criticism. China is an all-weather friend. It is becoming our mainstay in defence and business cooperation. But lets us not turn this into a national anthem. Let us retain the space for disagreement and have the grace to admit that as Iron Brother embraces another Big Brother there will inevitably be costs that he shall pay. It is better to debate it now rather than later. The writer is former executive editor of The News and a senior journalist with Geo TV. Email: syedtalathussain@gmail.com Twitter: @TalatHussain12