Walt Whitman’s Pakistan

In the 1990s a brave new political culture emerged from the bowels of the Bill Clinton political machine. Stan Greenberg, James Carville and Dick Morris helped shape this new culture. First emerging in America, it later spread across the Atlantic and around the world. It was, in its most vulgar summary form, governing by opinion polls.
A room full of statisticians and political consultants would eyeball the latest opinion poll data and try to determine what direction legislation and political rhetoric needed to take, to ensure sustained electoral success. A new poll was commissioned every day, sometimes more, and through it the leadership would know what to say, and how to say it.
Champions of governing by opinion polls rightly argue that this was a democratising trend. Instead of waiting till the next elections, pollsters were finding out how voters and citizens felt in real time. Once the public’s feelings were known, politicians like Bill Clinton would be able to serve their voters better – do what they wanted them to do.
Among the many legitimate critiques of this method of governing was the powerful counter-factual: if politicians are largely consumed by doing what is popular, and what will engender greater certitude of electoral victory, then how would politicians ever take unpopular but necessary decisions? How would leaders buck trends and take risks? How would they lead?
Like in every other sphere, Pakistan has imported this trend and adapted it to the local conditions. We don’t have a particularly numerate culture (something difficult to achieve in a country where literacy hovers below 60 percent and 25 million children remain out of school). Instead of actual polling then, our leaders, both the political class and the military corps commanders, essentially use the evening talk shows as barometers for their ‘numbers’.
Of course at one level, leaders have always sought the approval of the masses for the things they do. But

the gradual importance of this approval has dramatically increased as the technologies for information sharing and data dispersal have mushroomed. Today, a politician in Pakistan has many different ways by which he or she can gauge public opinion. Every television appearance, every tweet, every photo opportunity then becomes a performance. Performance anxiety is a terrible thing. If every leader is obsessed with their ‘performance’ how can we reasonably expect any politician to actually lead?
The short answer is that we cannot. It is this failure of leadership that we need to consider in assessing the broad range of challenges we face across several national issues. One issue that is particularly pertinent in this regard maybe the Pakistani relationship with the United States – that veritable original homeland of governing by opinion polls.
The traditional manner of examining the relationship is historical. But this is tricky, because most such journeys are ahistorical too – they begin where it is convenient for the narrator to begin. Instead, let’s take a more contemporary affairs approach. To assess the Pakistan-US relationship, let us begin by examining how things between the US and some other countries are going.
To Pakistan’s west, Iran has slowly but surely begun a process of détente with the United States. This was long in the making and, say what we may about Iranian democracy, is largely a product of popular will. This, despite a remarkable and consistent demonisation of Uncle Sam as the Great Satan for the better part of two Persian generations.
To Pakistan’s northwest, Afghanistan’s Loya Jirga, depleted as it may be of the approval of the Kandahari Taliban, spoke almost unanimously in favour of a long-term strategic agreement with the Americans. The agreement itself is almost certain to be signed, though remarkably, the evergreen President Hamid Karzai seems to still be able to dictate terms to the US government. While Pakistan had to wait almost eight months to get an apology for Salala, Karzai is able to extract apologies over long-weekends.
To Pakistan’s east, India is drifting ever closer to being run, once again by the right-wing BJP, yet it is doing so as the toast of Washington DC, Hollywood and Wall Street. Indian Americans adorn the American mindspace in breathtaking depth, from disgraced Rajat Gupta to PepsiCo’s graceful Indra Nooyi. From the unfunny Fareed Zakaria to the hilarious Aziz Ansari. From Sufi Deepak Chopra to the vigorously scientific Sanjay Gupta.
But beyond the public diplomacy of India’s people is the reality of the Indian economy and policy. At the heart of India’s growing relevance to America is its status as a democracy, as an investment dreamland, as a trading powerhouse, and as a manpower exporting machine.
To Pakistan’s northeast is of course China. No matter what the conspiracy websites tell you, Sino-American relations are strong. Their foundation, primarily economic, is resistant to minor irritants. The symbiosis between American excess and China’s prodigious capacity to manufacture the objects of American appetites is much more enduring than broader strategic attempts to ‘encircle’ China.
For the most part, whatever competition exists is economic, not ideological or military. And perhaps most importantly, on the issues important to Pakistan, China and America are a lot more in agreement than Pakistan and America.
These facts are well known to every Pakistani general who has sat in on meetings over the last decade with US leaders. They are also well known to the political leaders of every single party, including those that are pretending that drone strikes are the sole source of all that is wrong with Pakistan. Yet what is the Pakistani discourse on America?
Pakistanis have among the least favourable views of the US in the world. Both political and military leaders in this country have deliberately cultivated this dislike of America. This we know. Here’s the rub: Pakistani dislike of America is not altogether unrequited.
Americans that enjoy influence in the Washington DC, such as lawmakers, journalists, academics and former soldiers and spies, have all, at various times, felt betrayed by Pakistan, personally and at a national level.
While no American will admit defeat in Afghanistan, no serious person will deny failure. Pakistanis should remember who Americans blame for this failure – whether it is only partially true or not is immaterial. They blame Pakistan. Pakistanis are an honourable and proud people. Surely, it cannot be so difficult for us to understand that such a grudge may be carried a long, long time.
The reason the Salala apology, due to us for the killing of two dozen Pakistani soldiers, took eight months, while apologies for a single death in Afghanistan doesn’t take longer than a few days? It is that grudge.
The reason Secretary Chuck Hagel visits ally Pakistan for three hours, while Secretary Kerry spends three days, along with five other foreign ministers from the world’s great powers, helping enemy Iran reintegrate into the world? It is that grudge.
Pakistan has long enjoyed the ability to thwart US plans in Afghanistan – whether earlier on through alleged Pakistani support for the Taliban and the Haqqani Network, or today, through our ability to choke up Nato’s Ground Lines of Communication through Pakistan. Instead of taking juvenile pride in this, perhaps we should consider the long-term costs of this exercise of influence and power? Have we earned ourselves an intergenerational American grudge?
We need to reflect on the cost of governing by ‘opinion polls’. We don’t want to run against the opinion polls and raise taxes. We don’t want to run against the opinion polls and reduce subsidies. We don’t want to run against the opinion polls and openly accept America’s salience to our wellbeing – like the Iranians, Afghans and Indians have.
Pakistani military and political leaders want us to have our anti-American cake, and eat our American cake too. Such contradictions, even Walt Whitman would have avoided. We are certainly not large enough to contain such multitudes.
The writer is an analyst and commentator.