Trouble and troublemakers

Part - II
It was an ordinary man from a small village in North Waziristan who, on a matter of much lower importance than what is happening to Islam now, took up arms against the British. The dominant imperial power of the time deployed more than 50,000 troops against him and the Royal Air Force carried out ruthless bombardment against him. But it could neither kill Haji Mirza Ali Khan, the Faqir of Ipi, nor pacify troubled Waziristan until Britain’s departure from the Indian subcontinent.
Let our forces not make the same mistake by launching a full-scale military operation in North Waziristan because a small incident, by design or default, will spark a massive reaction and in no time make the entire population raise arms against their own army. Were that to happen, and no one wishes it will, Waziristan will become a territory impossible to control.
Two years ago there were strong rumours of an impending military operation in North Waziristan and I wrote an article in The News of June 3, 2010, opposing an operation. None of the concerns I had expressed then have materialised, which proves that my argument that a military operation is not a solution and will not achieve the desired objective. So it should not be resorted to unless all other available options which have not been exhausted.
The mistake of mistreating and misunderstanding Waziristan cannot and should not be overlooked in the assessment of the situation in that region. The people there were mistreated by not providing them with educational institutions and employment opportunities. As a result, the generations that followed had no education or employment. Being illiterate and unemployed, they became easy prey for militants, who took them into their fold.
Except for the Wazir area in North Waziristan, military operations have either taken place in the rest of the tribal agencies or are underway, but militancy still remains a threat. Why it has not been eliminated is a question that everyone asks. The ISPR has opted for silence on the subject, which has left a big void for all kind of rumours and apprehensions. Many believe it has something to do with our policy, which is why militancy is taking so long to decline. One argument in support of this contention is that those in powerful positions have some hidden agenda, or else how could foreign elements prosper and be allowed to grow that strong as to become a threat to us. The fault lies somewhere else. As the saying goes, it is not the gun that matters but the man behind the gun. So it is not the army that is at fault but the policy that they follow in this fight.
It is up to us to decide whether to continue with the existing policy and keep the country isolated or to bring about a change for the better to end the isolation.
Many operations have been conducted in the tribal areas in the last eight years and the treatment meted to the people during those operations was certainly not commendable. There is every likelihood that the same treatment would be repeated if an operation is launched in North Waziristan.
Before conducting any military operation we need to assess the situation objectively and view what we have done to our own people. There are people in other countries as simple as ours leading their lives in accordance with traditions that they inherited over the centuries but are in no way considered a threat to the government or the people there. They are not forced to change their way of life. The Amish community in America is the best example. They do not use modern facilities like, cars, telephones, television, the internet, and live in the same old and primitive manner of their forefathers. Since they do not pose any threat to the system the government has not forced them to change their life pattern and has left them to themselves.
Until 2003 Fata was as peaceful a place as one can imagine. It did not pose any threat to the government or the people at large. The crime rate there was less than the crime rate in a settled district. Why that situation is the opposite now is something to be worried about, and that is what our rulers need to understand.
The people of Waziristan had created no problem for the government, nor were they any threat to the system that we live in till the arrival of foreign forces in Afghanistan. Till then they were not blowing up schools and hospitals, nor stopping anyone from going to school. I myself studied in Wana, South Waziristan, and not once did anybody stop me from attending school. What happened after 9/11 is a different and tragic story.
The Kakul speech of army chief Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani gave fresh hope to the nation. Everyone favours positive change and wants setting the policy on the right track so as to take the country out of the quagmire that it is in today. Everyone wants restoration of Pakistan’s lost image as a peaceful, progressive country. And to achieve that nobody would hesitate from giving the ultimate sacrifice. Everybody would lend support to any person who can do that job. If that is what Gen Kayani meant then he does not need to opt for a military operation. That will be a futile exercise, with destructive repercussions. He needs to set the policy onto the right track, bridge the trust deficit by taking bold steps in line with public aspirations in areas where his troops are engaged. Once he does that, it will have a snowball effect and restore confidence of the people in the army. They will have no hesitation then to come forward and lend support to Gen Kayani that he asked for in his speech at Kakul.
The writer is a former ambassador.
Email: waziruk@hotmail.com